#research #rhetoric [[metonymy|Metonymy]] is surprisingly hard to define, especially when you try to [[metonymy is really hard to differentiate from synecdoche|differentiate metonymy from synecdoche]]. ### "Change of name" ==Classical rhetoricians understood metonymy as a **"change of name."**== You can still see this in metonymy's etymology—which basically means... "change of name." [[Metonymy, Grammar and Communication (2002)|Mendoza and Campo 2002]] cite the classical work, [[Rhetorica ad Herennium (80 BC)]], as the first attempt to define metonymy. It alludes to the change of name idea: > ‘Denomination [i.e. ‘metonymy’] is a trope that takes its linguistic form from near and close things and by which we can understand something that is not named by its own word’ [our translation]. > > (Her. IV: 32, 43, Anonymous, 1894: 337). > > \- qtd in Mendoza et al. footnote on p. 7. As a slight digression, note that Mendoza et al. translate the Latin "denominatio" as denomination (i.e., to denominate something, to _name_ it). They then use square brackets to clarify that we're talking about "metonymy." By contrast, [[Harry Caplan]], a translator, actually uses the term [[metonymy]] in his translation of that same section of _Rhetorica ad Herennium_: > "Metonymy is the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, **but not called by its own name**. This is accomplished by substituting the name of the greater thing for that of the lesser, as if one speaking of the Tarpeian Rock should term it "the Capitoline" > >\- [pp. 334-335](https://archive.org/details/adcherenniumdera00capluoft/page/334/mode/2up?q=metonymy) The additional text in Caplan translation also alludes to the part/whole idea. The ambiguity of what we mean by part/whole is relevant when trying to [[metonymy is really hard to differentiate from synecdoche|distinguish metonymy from synecdoche]] ### Contiguity One way of thinking about the nature of the metonymic shift is to say that it relies on a *contiguous* relationship. This basically works, except that no one really knows what exactly, "contiguous" means. Contiguity is supposed to mean something like a "direct" connection, but as [[Hugh Bredin]] points out, "contiguity seems in fact to refer to any type of relation whatsoever, other than similarity" ([[Bredin 1984 - Metonymy|p. 47]]). That being said, I think the "contiguity" thing points to something fundamental about metonymy: it relies on a physical relation of *some* sort. At some level, it's always a real-world, _material_ relation. This is different from a purely conceptual or categorical relation (which brings us towards [[synecdoche]]). The material or physical nature of metonymic relations leads me to believe that [[metonymy is — or might be — fundamentally indexical]]. ### Domains One way of thinking about metonymy is to think about how it works with respect to cognitive [[domain|domains]] or cognitive models. By "contiguity" we might say that the metonymic connection [[metaphors ''carry across'' domains but metonymy involves a single domain|works within a single domain]] (as opposed to something like [[metaphor]], which "carries across" from one domain to another).[^metaphor_vs_metonymy] [[Ronald Langacker]] got at this idea when he classified metonymy as [[Langacker 1993 - Reference-Point Constructions|a reference-point phenomenon]]: ![[langacker_metonymy_reference_point_figure_1.png]] Metonymy activates a domain, and it tells you what the most _salied_ part of that domain is: > "Metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be accurate, i.e., of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us” ([[Langacker 1993 - Reference-Point Constructions|p. 30]]). If I say to you, "I can't find my keys. I could use a good _pair of eyes_" then I am activating the most salient point in the domain: I need you to help me look for my keys. That's what eyes do.[^inference] [^inference]: You can also see from this example that [[implicature]] and inferencing are a huge part of what's going on in something like this. [[Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing (2003)]] [^metaphor_vs_metonymy]: This is important once you think about how [[metaphors often rely on one or several metonymic shifts]]. Sure, it might be a metaphor that gets you "across" from one domain to another—but it's metonymy that'll navigate for you once you *get there*.